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INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY

Yugoslavia

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SUBJECT

Strength and Policies of the Tito Regime

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- 1. The ruling clique around Tito believes Itself well informed about he inner situation of the Soviet Union and what it regards as its economic and military weakness. They regard the Cominform resolution, condemning Titoism, as merely a Soviet political maneuver which may cause a few family squabbles among Communists but which will never disturb the underlying solidity of their loyalty to the Markist ideal, even if they fight at times among themselves.
- 2. An example of this can be seen in a recent (Spring 1949) speech by Boris Kidric, Minister in Charge of the 5-Year Plan, at a conference held with workers in the Ministry. In this speech, Kidric covered the following points: Yugoslavs must not deceive themselves that help was coming from the cutside; there was no immediate hope of concluding a commercial agreement with Czechoslovakia or Hungary; Yugoslav Communists would defend the borders of their state in any contingency; eventually the USSR would come to recognize that Yugoslavs were real Communists and true friends of the Soviet Union; if war came between the USSR and the West, Yugoslavia would prove its loyalty to the USSR with deeds; although commercial relations existed now with the West, these were for the purposes of strengthening Yugoslavia to fight both her own and the Soviet Union's battles.
- 3. The leaders of Yugoslavia do not fear an attack by the Soviet Union. They speculate that at the worst perhaps, irregular forces from Bulgaria or Hungary might attempt to cross the border, but they believe there is no prospect of a serious armed clash with any of their neighbors. There is no doubt that Yugoslavia would throw her weight iswards the Soviet Union in the event of conflict with the West.
- 4. There is no unified opposition to Tite. There are local foci of opposition, too uncoordinated and small to be of importance. Among these are:

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- (a) Two former Wihailowitch officers operating in the Budrik Mountains of Serbia.
- (b) Two former Chesnik leaders, Kalakira and Kalajta, reportedly actively anti-Tito in Sarbla.
- (e) Isolated "trojkas" operating in mountainous regions.
- (d) In Croatia in 1946, there were small detachments of "krizers" who were former Ustashi. The police have eradicated most of these by
- (e) In Slovenia there are some small well organized groups of dissidents belonging to the Ma daz movement. These men are former adherents of Mihailovitch. Their organization publishes the illegal newspaper, Matjazer Glas.

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